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Introduction: In Praise of
Martin Chanock
Stephen Ellmann, Heinz Klug and Penelope Andrews*..
It is a pleasure to introduce this symposium in honour of Martin Chanock.
All of us have admired his insightful scholarship and enjoyed exploring
ideas with him for many years. When one of us (Penelope Andrews) had
the idea for a conference to celebrate Martin's work, the others ofus were
delighted to take part. Out of that conference, co-sponsored by La Trobe .
University's School of Law, and held at the University of Cape Town and
the University of Stellenbosch in December 2010, 1 comes this volume, a
rich array of scholarship reflecting the profoundly and valuably provocative contributions Martin has made over the years - as a scholar, as a
professional colleague across international boundaries and as an educator.
A central aspect of Martin Chanock's distinguished scholarship has
been his insight into the tangled roots of legal systems, "{hether systems
of customary law or the elaborate designs of Western rule of law states.
Both of these areas of his scholarship have influenced the writers here.
Much of Martin Chanock's work, exemplified by his influential book
Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi-and
Zambia (originally published in 1985 and reissued in 1998), has investigated the sources of customary law, generating the central perception
that culture and customary law are created. Moreover, they are created
by some rather than by others; they are the products and the vehicles of
social conflicts and power struggles, rather than the ineffable essence
of a people's history. This insight - illuminating as history, and deeply
challenging to contemporary political ideologies built around supposedly
traditional culture - fuels a number of the articles in this volume.
Fareda Banda's article, This One is from the Ladies: Thank You
Martin Chanock, Honorary African Feminist, attests to the significance
of Martin's work. Banda thanks Martin both for his personal generosity to
her - we will return to this personal side of Martin's contributions at the
end of this Introduction - and for the 'centrality' (Banda, 2012: 9) of his
scholarly work. As she observes, '[a]n academic thesis on most aspects of
·law in Africa is incomplete without reference to Chanock' (9). She recounts
his impact on her own thinking and on the scholarship of many others,
above all with respect to 'the gendered construction of customary law' (9).
She emphasises that his ideas have fuelled not only scholarly inquiry but
also political advocacy on behalf of African women - and ~ontinue to be
relevant to political struggles going on in Africa today. As Banda explains,
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moreover, Chanock's scholarship is valuable not only for its results but
also for its methods -for fostering a process of 'interrogat[ing] norms' (12),
for resisting a focus on Western assumptions in favour of a close examination of what we can discern of the concrete context of actual African lives,
and for being one of the earliest instances of'intersectional analysis' (14) .
Julia Sloth-Nielsen and Lea Mwambene also draw on a:n insight of
Martin Chanock's, that 'the development of customary law is at its best
a method of legitimation and not a system of rules' (Sloth-Nielsen and
Mwambene, 2012: 44, quoting Chanock, 1998: 238). They illustrate this
point in their article, Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: How Can
the Development of African Customary Law Be Understood?, by examining how South Africa, now committed to embracing customary law as
part of the ordinary law of the land, is actually going about this. It turns
out that South Africa's courts and law makers are trying many different approaches in this effort (seven that Sloth-Nielsen and Mwambene
identify) and these approaches generate a range of problems. The authors
point to confusion in the courts' jurisprudence: a court may 'confirm' a
pre-existing customary law principle, for example, but on the other hand
it may decide to 'develop' the rule in light of emerging conditions or
constitutional values. They find legislative attempts to address customary
law even more problematic, indeed perhaps 'repeat[ing] wholesale the
mistakes of the positivist past' (28). Attractive and legitimising as the
customary law ideal of norms developing in response to the evolution of
the community is, in other words, it is clearly no simple matter to meld
customary law and civil law together, even with the best of intentions.
Jonathan Todres emphasises that Chanock's lessons about customary law are actually lessons about the law of 'the North' as well. In Out
of Africa: Reading Martin Chanock's Scholarship in the Global North,
Todres focuses first on the salience of Chanock's link between 'power
and explanation' (Todres, 2012: 48). Just as power shapes the account of
traditional culture in African states, Todres reminds us, power shapes the
North's view of African states and its view of itself. From the North, the
. South appears full of problems that are the heritage of outmoded culture,
but a closer look at the North reveals similar problems, including gender
discrimination and human trafficking, in those cultures as well. Todres
writes that '[t]oday, as Chanock identifies, we no longer assert scientific
justifications for thinking whites or Westerners are superior, but have
instead substituted "culture" to speak of difference where we once spoke
of "race"' (56). At the same time, the attachment to an imagined, fixed
past has its echoes in the North too, not least in the current jurisprudence
of American constitutional law. A point Todres makes about children in
particular can be generalised: to remedy injustice, the actual voices of
victims need to be heard. Doing so will promote 'the common bonds of
humanity' (56) that Todres sees Chanock as helping us to understand.
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As significant as Chanock's customary law work is for a wide range of
legal systems, customary and otherwise, he has also focused close attention on one legal system in which customary law is only a component-the
law of South Africa. In 2001 Chanock published his remarkable volume,
The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear, Favour
and Prejudice. Two of the articles in this conference directly respond to
,
Chanock's examination of South Africa.
Hugh Corder, in 'Building a Nation': The Judicial Role in South
Africa, engages with Chanock's effort to draw lessons from the law's role
in creating the Union of South Africa in the early 20th century for the
process of building a post-apartheid nation now. Corder focuses on one ·
striking institutional comparison, between the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court (the highest court of the old South Africa) and today's
Constitutional Court. After surveying a number of aspects of the two
courts' situations, Corder argues that the Appellate Division sought to
consolidate a nation that it understood, above all, as governed by whites
but he also affirms that the court's promotion of a 'concept of the rule of
law', however imperfect, 'was not an insignificant achievement' (Corder,
2012: 70). Turning to the Constitutional Court, he finds it engaged in a
strikingly similar effort at state-making, though for a state guided by far
different fundamental values. Corder reads The Making of South African
Legal Culture as somewhat pessimistic about South Africa's prospects,
and finds some grounds for greater optimism in his examination of the
two courts. But he closes by commenting on the 'myriad challenges' faced
today by South Africa's 'constitutional project of governance' (72), and
with the possibility that events 'may yet prove Chanock's prognosis to be
the more accurate' (73).
In addition, one of us (Stephen Ellmann) explores another aspect of the
lessons of Chanock's study of South African law, in A Bittersweet Heritage:
Learning from The Making of South African Legal Culture. Ellmann takes
to heart and elaborates Chanock's insight that a racist system of law is
not racist only in certain discrete areas but will instead feel the pressure
of race in every aspect of its operation. He then asks, however, whether
the logic of this critique leads to the conclusion that the entire edifice
of Western legalism in South Africa should be dismantled. He answers
that the core idea of formalism - that courts have a 'special expertise and
responsibility in interpreting law and protecting rights' (87) - remains
correct, though of course only a par t of the new, value-based jurisprudence
the Constitution fosters. Ellmann urges that the courts can contribute
to the shaping of a better nation by creating a 'constitutionalism of no
slogans' (Ellmann, 2012: 88), in which (somewhat as Todres suggests) the
courts hear as fully as possible the diverse and complex appeals of ~outh
Africa's people.
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Frank Munger, responding to Ellmann's argument, suggests in his
article, The Cause Lawyer's Cause, that the path to the rule of law may
be even more crooked than Ellmann's reading of Chanock suggests. Not
all courts have the independence and the legitimacy that South Africa's
courts enjoy, founded partly on their professional virtues and partly on
the new nation's substantial embrace of rule of law values. Nor are all
lawyers committed to democratic and egalitarian principles. Yet Munger
suggests that lawyers' work may appear less exalted and yet still offer
important promise. In a country without elite support for legalism, 'grassroots advocates' (Munger, 2012: 100) may still manoeuvre for change at
local levels and may even achieve results not through appeals to judges
but through alliances with members of the bureaucracy. They may in fact
have such effects, Munger argues, though they themselves do not fully
embrace Western 'rule of law' ideas. Munger closes, however, with an
observation true to Chanock's approach as well: that these benign effects
depend on the 'co-evolution of society', a project 'courts and cause lawyers
alone have little power to determine' (104-5).
Chris Arup's analysis of Australian public interest law also emphasises how much cause lawyering in any given country is shaped by the
particulars of that setting. In Educating Cause Lawyers in Australia After
South Africa, Arup notes that Australia has not embraced constitutional
rights to the same extent as the United States and South Africa. At the
same time, however, Australian lawyers have deployed the legal resources
they do have - rich legal resources, though primarily involving common
law claims and regulatory law arguments instead of constitutional assertions - to considerable effect. Arup traces the ways that cause lawyering
in Australia confirms Chanock's insights about the essential institutional
elements of the rule of law. This is 'largely ... conventional lawyering'
(Arup, 2012: 107), and it is conventional lawyering that seems to work in
the Australian context.
All of these articles' efforts to discern a path towards more just societies through the sometimes very imperfect institutions of the present
are addressing a problem very much at the heart of Chanock's own
current work. In his article, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Africa:
Constitutionalism Upside Down, Chanock offers a preview of the book
he is now writing, in which he examines the difficult history of African
constitutionalism, and concludes that a critical problem has been the 'lack
of any underlying sense of a rule oflaw' (Chanock, 2012: 137). Where can
African constitutionalists find a foundation on which to build this sense?
Chanoc~ is not certain that an answer will be found, but he maintains that
the way to find the answer is a contextual one: 'The rule of law cannot be
built from the top down, some attachment to it must inhere in the society
itself (137). He is deeply sceptical of constitutional innovations that
'fl.oat above (and indeed contradict) the ways in which laws are actually
4

administered and the perceptions of lawfulness in the society as a whole'
(139). Even 'the discourse of human rights, like the discourse of socialism,
is primarily an imported discourse' (137) .
Instead of relying only on such imports, Chanock would return tP
the customary law. This is a customary law understood, to be sure, not
as some set of fixed legacies of the past (the conception he did so much to
disestablish) but rather as 'newly and continuously produced by ongoing
economic and political processes' (138) and as a 'dialogue, including a
dialogue with the imported individualising discourse and centralising
ambitions of bills ofrights' (141). Acknowledging the paradoxical element
in seeking to achieve constitutionalism and the rule of law by a path that
is 'not simply through a bill of rights' (142), he concludes that 'a process
and context oriented law may well be a necessary part of the creation of a
rule oflaw culture, which must underlie a rights culture, precisely because
it is one which people can fully inhabit, and one which is less a creature
of post-imperial national and international elites' (142). Even this brief
summary of his argument leaves no doubt that Chanock, as alwa,ys, is
pressing us all to think beyond our limits.
Important as Martin Chanock's scholarship has been, however, he has
been a teacher as well as a scholar. Chris Arup, in his article, not only
provides a picture of Australian cause lawyering but also traces Chanock's
contributions to educating the lawyers who now do Australia's l~ yering, cause and otherwise. Over 30 years as a legal educator, Chanock
helped create the program at La Trobe Law School. He and his colleagues
devised interdisciplinary courses - nb longer offered today but still plainly
influencing the courses in the present curriculum. Chanock also supported
educating students for the practice of cause lawyering, and while it turned
out that many students' interest lay elsewhere, an 'optional social justice
path' (Arup, 2012: 120), and a leading clinical program as part of it, have
become ongoing elements of La Trobe's pedagogy.
As much as these articles reveal the impact Martin has had, we want
to close with a personal account of Martin's contributions as a member
of the La Trobe faculty and the world's intellectual fellowship from one
of his close colleagues, Professor Jianfu Chen, former Head of School at
La Trobe. Professor Chen eloquently introduced the conference and we
are very happy to quote here some of what he said about Martin (Chen,
2010: 4-5):
There is a Chinese saying ... which means, to paraphrase, let
the decent be in power and the capable in position. This initially
sounds as if decency and capacity (or talent) are separate from
each other, but that is not true. Confucian tradition, at least the
'proper' 9ne, has always emphasised that one is never a great
scholar without being decent. Chinese culture equally emphasises .
that one must first learn to be a human person before becoming
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a scholar, a musician, a teacher, or maybe even a lawyer. Here,
being a human person means being a decent person.
Decency is what we desire at heart, but decency is rarely
mentioned in public discourse, and certainly not one of the
criteria in any job selection. The requirement for decency is too
closely associated with rule by man, not rule of law. And in rule
of law, we have for long firmly believed, despite frequent disappointment, that a strong institutional arrangement will itself
curb human indecency. You do not need to look too far in your
life to find disappointment in this regard.
Decency means you dare to stand up and be counted for your
beliefs, principles and independent thinking. In this regard it
also means that you welcome differences, diversity and opposition. As we know, and as Chinese would say, sincere advice is
not pleasant to the ears, but beneficial in practice. Too often, this
is easier said than done.
Decency means consistency; you practice what you preach.
Or, once again to paraphrase a Chinese saying, what one does
not like oneself, one must not do to others.
Decency means your passion and compassion for your fellow
human beings, especially those around you such as your family
members and your colleagues. Mentoring and cultivating your
junior colleagues is not meant to be a duty; it is simply part of
being decent.
Decency takes nothing as given; you get what you give and
you deserve what is due.
In short, the seemingly easy task of being a decent person
demands the output of the highest quality of human beings:
honesty, integrity, passion, and compassion.
I am, of course, not talking about philosophies, I am talking
about Professor Martin Chanock as a person - my mentor and
dear friend and, above all, one of the most decent human beings
I have encountered in my life.
I salute you, Martin. You taught me and many others, by
your conduct and behaviour, how to be a decent person, even
when being so is sometimes at a personal cost. You have set
an extremely high bar for being the decent scholar that we all
aspire to be.
Professor Chen closed with two words, which we want to make our
own as well: 'Thank you!'

Notes
*
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All ofus thank Professor Paula Baron for her assistance throughout the process of bringing this volume to completion. Thanks also to the librarians of
the Mendik Law Library at New York Law School for timely and resourceful
research help, and to Rebecca Fung of The Federation Press.
Law, Culture, Constitutionalism and Governance: Conference to Honour
Martin Chanock, University of Cape Town and University of Stellenbosch,
10-11 December 2010.
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